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Introduction
The present symposium has been convened to consider "the signifi-
cance of unilateral United States actions since the tragic September 11
attacks on the World Trade Center."' "Unilateralism" is taken, in much of
contemporary political discourse, to imply a selfish wrong-headedness,
perhaps born of arrogance, on the part of the unilateral actor. On closer
inspection, however, the matter is more complex (as matters generally tend
to be). At least in the context of responding to international terrorism,
certain aspects of "U.S. unilateralism" are, in fact, understandable, perhaps
inevitable, and probably prudent. The present essay will consider the issue
of U.S. unilateralism within the particular context of criminal prosecutions
for terrorists offenses.
t Professor of Law, Duke Law School; Director, Duke/Geneva Institute in
Transnational Law. This essay develops ideas earlier presented in Madeline Morris,
Arresting Terrorism: Criminal Jurisdiction and International Relations, in ENFORCING
INTERNATIONAL LAW RULES AGAINST TERRORISM (Andrea Bianchi, ed., 2004).
1. Letter from Jean Carmalt, Symposium Editor, to Madeline Morris (invitationing
Professor Morris to speak at the symposium, "US Unilateralism: International Law,
Security, and Policy Post-9/11") (on file with author).
36 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 473 (2004)
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International terrorism sits at the cusp of crime, domestic politics,
and international relations. Precisely because terrorist offenses are poised
at that volatile intersection, significant practical, legal, and political diffi-
culties attend the exercise of criminal jurisdiction over terrorist crimes in
any forum. Prosecutions in the domestic courts of affected states pose one
set of concerns, while prosecutions in an international criminal court, or
in the domestic courts of third-party states under universal jurisdiction,
pose others. While the impetus to "internationalize" enforcement of anti-
terrorism laws is understandable and its logic compelling in certain
respects, this essay will conclude that the United States' preference for
domestic prosecutions reflects a sensible choice and, likely, the best choice
among the available range of imperfect options.
I. The Impetus to Internationalize Enforcement
Most crime is prosecuted at the national, not the international, level.
This is true even of cross-border crime. For the most part, states criminal-
ize conduct domestically. Where states need to cooperate with other states
to enforce their domestic criminal law, they do so through mutual legal
assistance agreements, extradition treaties, coordination of investigations,
and the like.
But terrorism is not ordinary crime. It is not even ordinary cross-bor-
der crime. Although the term "terrorism" has no international legal defini-
tion, the term would seem to indicate, at a minimum, an unlawful violent
act committed for a political purpose. Unsurprisingly, since terrorism has
political motives, states are typically the targets and, not infrequently, the
sponsors of terrorism. This fact enormously complicates the issue of crim-
inal jurisdiction over terrorism. The likely involvement of states as targets
or sponsors of terrorism creates an impetus to resort to some authority
above the state for the handling of terrorist offenses.
It is easy to understand this impulse to seek an authority above the
state for the handling of terrorist offenses when the alternative would be to
rely for law enforcement on the very state that has sponsored the terrorist
act. Consider, for example, the bombing of Pan Am flight 103, the flight
that exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland. It appears that the bombing was in
fact sponsored by the government of Libya. 2
The Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Montreal Convention) criminalizes
and provides for the prosecution of aircraft bombing.3 Libya, the UK, and
the United States each were parties to that treaty at all times relevant to the
2. Libya has formally accepted responsibility for the bombing. See Letter of Aug.
15, 2003 from the Representative of the Libyan Arab jamahiriya to the President of the
U.N. Security Council; see also U.N.S.C. Res. 731, Preamble (1992) (in which the Secur-
ity Council states that it is "[d]eeply concerned over the results of investigations, which
implicate officials of the Libyan government" in the bombing of Pan Am flight 103).
3. Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, 974 U.N.T.S. 177 [hereinafter "Montreal
Convention"].
Vol. 36
2004 Terrorism and Unilateralism
Lockerbie case. 4 The Montreal Convention provides that whenever an indi-
vidual suspected of aircraft bombing is found on the territory of a state
party to the treaty, that state must either prosecute the suspect or extradite
him for prosecution elsewhere. 5 This provision for "aut dedere, aut judi-
care" is quite standard in the several multilateral treaties dealing with what
would generally be thought of as "terrorist offenses."'6
The two suspects in the Lockerbie case were Libyan nationals living in
Libya. Libya indicated that it would prosecute the suspects in its own
national courts. Since there was evidence that Libya had sponsored the
bombing, this posed a problem. The United Kingdom. and the United
States. insisted that Libya not prosecute the suspects but, rather, extradite
them to the United States or the United Kingdom for prosecution. The
issue was presented to the U.N. Security Council. Based on the evidence
that Libya itself was implicated in the crime, the Security Council issued
resolution 748, under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, effectively requiring
the extradition of the suspects. 7
Libya took the position that the Security Council lacked the authority
to issue that resolution. This dispute resulted in cases, brought by Libya
against the United Kingdom and the United States, before the International
Court of Justice ("ICJ"). 8
4. See 46 U.N. Y.B.RBK. 52 (1992).
5. Specifically, Article 7 of the Montreal Convention provides: "The Contracting
state in the territory of which the alleged offender is found shall, if it does not extradite
him, be obliged, without exception whatsoever and whether or not the offence was com-
mitted in its territory, to submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of
prosecution." Montreal Convention, supra note 3, art. 7.
6. See Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16,
1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105; Montreal Convention, supra note 3; Protocol for
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil
Aviation, supplementary to the Convention of Sept. 23, 1971, Feb. 24, 1988, S. Treaty
Doc. No. 100-19; Convention and Protocol on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against
the Safety of Maritime Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 668; International Conven-
tion Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, TIAS No. 11,081, 1316 U.N.T.S.
205; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035
U.N.T.S. 167; Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel,
Dec. 15, 1995, U.N. GAOR 49th Sess., Supp. No. 49, Vol. 1, at 299, U.N. Doc. A/49/49
(1994), 34 I.L.M. 482 (1995); International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist
Bombings, 37 I.L.M. 249 (1998); International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism, Jan. 10, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 270 (2000).
For an analysis of the jurisdictional provisions of the terrorism treaties and their legal
bases and implications, see Madeline Morris, High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC
and Non-Party States, 64 LAW & CONTSMP. PROBS. 13, 60-66 (2001).
7. See U.N.S.C. Res. 748, para. 1 (1992).
8. See Application Instituting Proceedings, I.C.J. Gen. List No. 88, filed 3 March
1992 [Libya v. UK]; Application Instituting Proceedings, I.C.J. Gen. List No. 89, filed 3
March 1992 [Libya v. US].
At the joint request of the parties, on September 10, 2003, the ICJ ordered these cases
to be discontinued with prejudice. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the
1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom), Order, I.CJ. Gen. List No. 88, 10 September 2003;
Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising
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At the base of that dispute is the legal problem posed by state sponsor-
ship of terrorism. Libya, which would ordinarily be responsible for the
enforcement of the law against aircraft sabotage in this case, hardly could
be relied upon for that purpose if the government of Libya is in fact respon-
sible for the crime. In this respect, the terrorism treaties, with their "prose-
cute-or-extradite" structures for jurisdiction, have a built-in limitation: they
do not provide for the foreseeable circumstance in which the crime was in
fact sponsored by the state that has custody of the suspect.
State-sponsored terrorism has led logically to an impetus toward some
form of supra-national authority for the handling of terrorist offenses.
Resort to a supra-national authority is sought to safeguard against perpe-
trators' being shielded from justice by the states that have sponsored their
terrorist acts.
The United States and United Kingdom resorted to a supra-national
authority in responding to state sponsorship of terrorist crimes in the
Lockerbie bombing case. In that instance, the authority resorted to was the
U.N. Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. To be
sure, the purpose of recourse to the Security Council was to gain custody
of the defendants for criminal prosecution in the domestic criminal courts
of the United States or United Kingdom. But the route through which that
outcome was sought to be attained was the supra-national authority of the
Security Council.
Another supra-national mechanism that some have advocated for the
handling of terrorism cases is the International Criminal Court or "ICC. '" 9
The ICC would both provide the supra-national authority to assure that the
case would be pursued and, also, constitute the criminal forum in which
the case would actually be tried.
The prospect of the ICC serving as an international forum for the
prosecution of terrorism presents a number of questions. The next Section
will examine the broad policy issues concerning international jurisdiction
over terrorism that arise from the political nature of terrorist offenses. The
final Section of this essay will then consider particular legal questions con-
cerning the ICC's capacity to adjudicate international terrorism cases. As
the political and legal impediments to effective "internationalized" or multi-
from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Jamahiriya v. United States of America),
Order, L.CJ. Gen. List No. 89, 10 September 2003.
That joint request for discontinuance of the cases followed the resolution of the dis-
pute through political channels. See Letter of Aug. 15, 2003 from the Representative of
the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the President of the U.N. Security Council.
9. The ICC is intended to be a permanent international criminal court. It was
established pursuant to a multilateral treaty. Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 [hereinafter ICC Treaty].
The ICC had not been established at the time of the Lockerbie bombing. However, the
use of an ad hoc international criminal tribunal was proposed, though ultimately
rejected at that time, as a jurisdictional resolution for the Lockerbie dispute. See James
Crawford, The ILC Adopts a Statute for an International Criminal Court, 89 AM. J. INT'L L.
404, 408 (1995).
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lateral prosecution of terrorist offenses are identified, the logic underlying
"US unilateralism" in this arena becomes evident.
II. Is Internationalizing Enforcement Good Policy?
It is fairly easy to understand the impulse to internationalize law
enforcement-for example, through recourse to the UN Security Council or
to the ICC-where the state that would otherwise be relied upon for law
enforcement is itself implicated in terrorist offenses. Enforcement by an
international authority impedes the capacity of implicated states to shield
perpetrators from justice. It is somewhat more difficult, however, to under-
stand the impulse to internationalize law enforcement where the state that
would otherwise exercise jurisdiction is not the perpetrator state but,
rather, the state that was the target or "victim" of the crime.
Why is it, then, that, when the United States suffered terrorist attacks
on September 11, 2001, there were suggestions that prosecutions should
be conducted outside of the courts of the United States, in third-party
states or in an international tribunal? A major reason appears to be that
the United States was viewed, in effect, as a "party to the conflict." The
courts of the United States, it was said, could not be relied upon to be
neutral or, in any case, might be perceived to be non-neutral. Therefore,
some argued, the case should be handled by an entity outside of the princi-
pally-affected state: an international court or a third-party state exercising
universal jurisdiction.
In fact, this was essentially the same argument as was made by Libya
before the ICJ in the Lockerbie case, and the same concern as was
expressed by several of the ICJ judges in separate and dissenting opinions
in the ICJ's 1992 opinion denying provisional measures in that case. Judge
Shahabuddeen, for example, questioned whether the accused could receive
an impartial trial in the United States. 10 Judge ad hoc El-Kosheri stated
that the accused "could not possibly receive a fair trial, neither in the
United States or in the United Kingdom, nor in Libya."' "I
The impulse to internationalize justice processes in this area is an
understandable and, perhaps, logical response to the recognition that
crimes of terrorism have a political component. Because of the political
aspect of international terrorism cases, the reasoning goes, states (be they
perpetrator states or target states) are interested parties in these cases.
And, as interested parties, states-perpetrator states or target states-can-
not be permitted to stand as judges in their own causes.
Internationalization of justice in this field might be a tidy solution to
this problem if there were an international institution that states trusted
sufficiently to decide these matters. The problem is that this sort of confi-
10. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention
Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of
America), Provisional Measures, Order of 14 April 1992, 1992 I.CJ. Reports 1992, p.
114, 141 (separate opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen).
11. Id. at 216 (Judge ad hoc El-Kosheri, dissenting).
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dence in international institutions frequently is lacking, and for compre-
hensible reasons.
States accused of sponsoring terrorism question the legitimacy and
the neutrality of the international institutions that would assert authority.
Certainly, Libya has challenged the Security Council's action on both of
those grounds in the Lockerbie case.
Significantly, states that are the targets of terrorism also have been
unwilling to rely upon international handling of those cases. A targeted
state may question the effectiveness of international investigative and
prosecutorial mechanisms, particularly if the targeted state has highly
developed investigative and prosecutorial systems domestically and has
substantial resources to devote to the cases. Targeted states also are aware
that different states have different interests; not all states are similarly situ-
ated relative to terrorism. Targeted states may therefore be unwilling to
relegate the handling of terrorism cases to an international court that may
have different priorities from those of the targeted state. In addition, a
targeted state may question whether the international institution that
would handle the cases will share the state's view of the law in this field in
which there remain so many differences of interpretation and so many
open legal questions. 12 The United States, certainly, declined any sugges-
tion of an international tribunal for prosecution of the crimes of September
11, 2001. Precisely because terrorist crimes do pose a threat to the
national security of targeted states, and precisely because terrorist crimes
do have volatile political and foreign-relations dimensions, states are par-
ticularly wary of relinquishing control over these cases to international
bodies.
Having identified some of the difficulties that attend international
jurisdiction over crimes of terrorism, it quickly becomes clear that a simi-
lar set of weaknesses affects the option of holding terrorism trials in the
domestic courts of third-party states under universal jurisdiction. Under
the international law doctrine of universal jurisdiction, any state may pros-
ecute individuals for certain international crimes without regard to the
territory where the crimes were committed or the nationality of perpetra-
tors or victims. 13 Universal jurisdiction is thus distinguished from other
internationally recognized bases for jurisdiction by the fact that universal
jurisdiction is not based on a particular nexus between the offense and the
prosecuting state. 14
12. The definition of "terrorism" has itself remained highly controversial. Certainly,
there is no international legal definition of the term. The General Assembly debates
following September 11, 2001 reflected the highly contentious nature of this question,
with Middle East politics virtually assuring that no international consensus on a defini-
tion will be arrived at in the near future. See Christian Miller, U.S. Strikes Back, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 11, 2001, at p.3.
13. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 404, 423 (1987).
14. Universal jurisdiction is one among the five bases for jurisdiction comprising
the standard list of internationally recognized forms of jurisdiction. Each of the other
four jurisdictional bases (territoriality, nationality, passive personality, and protective
principle) is founded on a particular nexus between the offense and the state asserting
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Two distinct arguments are put forward in favor of universal jurisdic-
tion over terrorism cases. The first is that terrorist crimes are of concern to
all states. The second is that third-party states may be relied upon to be
more impartial in terrorism cases than the principally-affected states.
Neither of those arguments withstands scrutiny.
The first argument for universal jurisdiction over terrorism, that all
states have an interest in ensuring accountability for terrorist crimes, is
belied by the very existence of state-sponsored terrorism. But, even if we
were to accept, arguendo, the existence of such a unity of interest at least
among states that do not themselves sponsor terrorist crimes (a point
which certainly could be debated), the interests of states obviously diverge
on a great number of other matters. Because criminal trials for terrorism
do not exist in isolation from those other aspects of interstate relations, we
may anticipate that universal jurisdiction would sometimes be used as a
tool for achieving other political ends. For this reason, third-party states
may not be consistently relied upon to be impartial in the handling of ter-
rorism-related cases.
Certainly, we can envision a state selectively targeting for prosecution
the officials of another state with which it is in conflict. But, beyond the
blatant use of universal jurisdiction to pursue an opponent state in the
courtroom rather than on the battlefield, there is the more subtle and, in
some ways, more serious problem of states adjudicating cases with such
highly politicized content that the political perspective of the prosecuting
state (or individual prosecutor) is inevitably consequential. Belgian magis-
trates, for example, have taken up investigations (with or without subse-
quent indictment) of Ariel Sharon, Yasser Arafat, Henry Kissinger, Ali
Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, Fidel Castro, Saddam Hussein, and others. In
such politically charged contexts, the decision of which cases to pursue
and which to bypass cannot help but be informed by the political perspec-
tives of the prosecuting state or the individual prosecuting official.
Thus, the second argument for universal jurisdiction over terrorism
cases-that third-party states can be relied upon as neutral adjudicators in
relation to terrorist acts-is simply unrealistic. Precisely because terrorism
has a political component-and international terrorism has an interna-
tional political component-it would be naive to assume that the state that
would step forward to exercise universal jurisdiction would reliably be
more neutral or impartial than the principally affected state.' 5
The fundamental quandary posed by the position of states as inter-
ested parties in terrorism cases lies at the base of the political debate con-
cerning the best configuration of criminal jurisdiction over terrorism. The
terrorism treaties, with their "extradite-or-prosecute" clauses, have fallen far
short of resolving the difficulties concerning jurisdiction over terrorist
jurisdiction. See generally Kenneth Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International
Law, 66 TEx. L. REV. 785, 785-88 (1988).
15. For a fuller consideration of the political implications of universal jurisdiction,
see Madeline Morris, Universal Jurisdiction in a Divided World, 35 NEv ENG. L. REV. 337
(2001).
Cornell International Law Journal
offenses. Because international terrorism implicates volatile issues of
international politics and interstate relations, the extradite-or-prosecute
regime for jurisdiction over terrorism is flawed insofar as it relies on states:
non-neutral perpetrator states, or non-neutral targeted states, or third-party
states that, in fact, cannot be presumed to be-or will not be perceived to
be-neutral. Similarly, because of the political features of international ter-
rorism, utilizing international fora for the prosecution of terrorist crimes
also does not satisfactorily fulfill the complex requirements for effective
enforcement in this field. The inherent political impediments to effective
use of international fora for the prosecution of terrorist offenses are well
exemplified in the context of the ICC.
III. The ICC as an International Enforcement Mechanism
The political difficulties surrounding the use of international fora for
the prosecution of terrorist crimes are reflected in a number of legal con-
straints on the powers of the ICC. These limitations concern the ICC's
jurisdictional structure, its complementarity regime, and the international
law of immunities. Unsurprisingly, these legal limitations, which reflect
states' political concerns, also in practice place constraints on the ICC's
capacity effectively to prosecute crimes of international terrorism.
A. Limitations Arising from the ICC's Jurisdictional Structure
As the subject-matter jurisdiction of the ICC is currently defined, ter-
rorist crimes come within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the ICC only if
the particular terrorist acts also constitute genocide, war crimes, or (as is
more likely) crimes against humanity. Those are the three crimes cur-
rently within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the ICC.16 Therefore, only
if a terrorist act comprised the elements of one of those three crimes would
that terrorist act come within the jurisdiction of the ICC. 1 7 Proposals to
include terrorism per se within ICC jurisdiction were defeated in the ICC
treaty negotiations process, in part because of politically charged disagree-
ments between states as to the appropriate definition of "terrorism."
In addition to limitations on ICC powers based on subject-matter
jurisdiction, there are also limitations on the ICC's exercise of jurisdiction
that are based on nationality and territoriality. By the terms of the ICC
Treaty, unless the U.N. Security Council refers a case to the ICC, the ICC
may exercise jurisdiction only if the crime was committed by the national
of or on the territory of a state party to the ICC treaty (or by the national of
16. See ICC Treaty, supra note 9, art. 5. While the ICC Treaty also provides for
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, see id. art. 5(1)(d), the treaty further provides
that the ICC shall not exercise that part of its subject-matter jurisdiction until such time
as the treaty is amended to include provisions defining the crime of aggression and
setting out the conditions under which the court will exercise jurisdiction over that
crime. See id., art. 5(2).
17. Concerning the possibility of future expansion of the ICC's jurisdiction to
include terrorism crimes that do not constitute genocide, war crimes, or crimes against
humanity, see infra Part III.D.
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or on the territory of a non-party state that has consented to ICC jurisdic-
tion ad hoc for the matter in question). i8 Consequently, crimes committed
on the territory of a non-consenting, non-party state by the national of a
non-consenting, non-party state may not be prosecuted before the ICC. In
the course of the ICC treaty negotiations, some states advocated that the
ICC should be accorded universal jurisdiction (that is, jurisdiction without
regard to the territory where the crime occurred or to the nationality of the
perpetrator or victim). However, other states prevailed in their view that
ICC jurisdiction should be limited, absent Security Council referral, to
cases in which a state party to the treaty had territorial or nationality-based
nexus to the crime in question (or in which such a state consented ad hoc
to ICC jurisdiction.) These limitations on the ICC's exercise of jurisdiction
preclude ICC prosecution of terrorist acts committed by a non-consenting,
non-party state's national within his own state and, also, terrorist acts
committed by a non-consenting, non-party state's national in a different
non-party state. Based on the current state of ICC ratifications, these limi-
tations would, for instance, have precluded ICC prosecution of any of the
nineteen hijackers responsible for the attacks of September 11, 2001 (had
they survived, and had the ICC been established at that time).
In addition to those limitations on the ICC's exercise of jurisdiction
that are based on the terms of the ICC Treaty itself, there also is a question
about whether the ICC may lawfully exercise jurisdiction when the defen-
dant is a national of a non-consenting, non-party state-even if the crimes
were committed on the territory of a state party. Such an exercise of juris-
diction over a non-party national is permitted under the terms of the ICC
Treaty. But some states-notably, the US-have argued that such ICC juris-
diction over non-party nationals would be unlawful. 19 This issue remains
unresolved, as a political as well as a legal matter. Since state sponsors of
terrorism are unlikely to become parties to the ICC Treaty, this issue may
be of particular significance in relation to ICC jurisdiction over terrorism
offenses.
B. Limitations Arising from the ICC's Complementarity Regime
An additional set of impediments to effective ICC jurisdiction over
terrorism offenses is posed by the ICC's "complementarity" regime, encom-
passed in articles 17-19 of the ICC Treaty. Under article 17, a case is
admissible before the ICC only if the states that would otherwise have
jurisdiction are unable or unwilling genuinely to investigate and, where
appropriate, to prosecute the case in question. The complementarity
regime was designed to reflect the position, arrived at in the course of the
ICC treaty negotiations, that states should retain primary authority and
18. ICC Treaty, supra note 9, art. 12.
19. For a comprehensive treatment of concerns regarding ICC jurisdiction over non-
party nationals, see Madeline Morris, High Crimes, supra note 6. The arguments in that
article formed the legal basis of the U.S. position on this issue. See David Scheffer,
Staying the Course with the International Criminal Court, 35 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 47, 66 n.
68 (2002).
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control over prosecutions for international crimes, with the ICC serving as
a fail-safe enforcement mechanism of last resort.
The apparatus for implementing the complementarity regime, laid out
in Articles 18 and 19 of the ICC Treaty, may allow state sponsors of terror-
ism opportunities to forestall, if not to prevent, terrorism prosecutions
before the ICC. Under Article 18, the ICC prosecutor is required to publi-
cize his or her intention to proceed with an investigation. Notice must be
sent to all states parties and to all states that would ordinarily exercise
jurisdiction over the crimes in question. At a minimum, this provision
would require notice to the state where the crime was committed and to the
suspect's state of nationality. This means that, where state-sponsored ter-
rorism is involved, that state sponsor is likely to be among the states enti-
tled to early notice of the prosecutor's intentions. The ICC Treaty does
provide that the prosecutor may make such notice confidentially, and may
limit the scope of information provided in order to prevent the destruction
of evidence or the absconding of suspects. But, where a notified state is
complicit with the suspects, those provisions cannot obviate the potential
disadvantage to the prosecution.
The obstacles to effective terrorism prosecutions that are posed by
Article 18 do not end there. Within one month of receiving notice of inves-
tigation from the ICC prosecutor, a state may inform the prosecutor that
the state itself is investigating or has investigated the crime in question,
and may request that the ICC prosecutor defer to the state's investigation.
Having been so requested by a state, the prosecutor may not proceed fur-
ther with an investigation unless he receives authorization to do so from
the ICC's Pre-Trial Chamber. 20 Article 18 applies to all cases except those
referred by the U.N. Security Council.
An additional determination of the admissibility of a case before the
ICC may also be made through a proceeding under Article 19 of the treaty.
The Article 19 procedure is applicable to all cases before the ICC, including
those based on a referral by the U.N. Security Council. Article 19 permits
challenges based on jurisdiction or admissibility. Those challenges may be
brought by the accused, by a state with jurisdiction over the case, or by a
state whose consent would be required for the ICC to exercise jurisdiction
over the case. If a challenge is made by a relevant state, then "the Prosecu-
tor shall suspend the investigation until such time as the Court makes a
determination in accordance with Article 17.''21 Challenges under Article
19 may be made before or after confirmation of the charges.
The pre-trial proceedings provided for under Articles 18 and 19 of the
ICC Treaty, then, provide opportunities for a state to forestall an investiga-
20. Under Article 18, if the Pre-Trial Chamber declines to authorize the continuation
of investigation by the ICC prosecutor, the prosecutor may re-apply subsequently based
on new facts or evidence. A determination by the Pre-Trial Chamber on this issue may
be appealed by the prosecutor or by the relevant state. The prosecutor may apply for
provisional measures in order to preserve evidence during the course of Article 18
proceedings.
21. ICC Treaty, supra note 9, art. 19(7).
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tion or prosecution. The Treaty does provide that the court may give excep-
tional authorization to the prosecutor to continue an investigation "where
there is a unique opportunity to obtain important evidence or there is a
significant risk that such evidence may not be subsequently available."
22
But, once again, that safeguard, while ameliorating the problem, cannot
eliminate it.
Cumulatively, the complementarity provisions of the ICC Treaty
would allow a state sponsor of terrorism to impede ICC prosecution of a
case. The ICC might, nevertheless, ultimately succeed in concluding an
effective and appropriate prosecution. While Article 17 provides that a
case shall not be admissible before the ICC where that case is being investi-
gated or prosecuted by a state with jurisdiction over it, an exception is
made where that state is determined by the ICC to be unable or unwilling
genuinely to carry out the investigation or the prosecution. If the ICC
determines that a state is unable or unwilling "genuinely" to proceed, then
the ICC, by the terms of the Treaty, may exercise jurisdiction even over the
objection of that state. But much time will have passed between the
moment when the prosecutor informed a state of his intention to investi-
gate and the time when that state is determined to be-contrary to its
protestations-unwilling genuinely to investigate or to prosecute. Perhaps
in some cases the outcome will nevertheless, ultimately, be desirable. In
other cases, very likely, the ICC's effectiveness will be limited by the exi-
gencies of complementarity. 2 3
C. Limitations Arising from the International Law of Immunities
The international law of diplomatic, sovereign, and head-of-state
immunities embodies the principle of the sovereign equality of states (by
prohibiting one state from standing in judgment on the official acts or the
head of state of another state) and facilitates diplomatic relations (by
prohibiting one state from bringing legal process against a foreign diplo-
mat present on its territory). The law of immunities is thus intended both
to reflect the fundamental structures of international law and to facilitate
peaceful interstate relations.
If a high government official bears responsibility for the perpetration
of a terrorist crime (as may often be the case), that individual may be
immune from ICC jurisdiction under the international law of immunities.
This problem is not at all evident on the face of the ICC Treaty. Indeed, the
Treaty clearly states that immunities will not be recognized for the crimes
now within the jurisdiction of the Court. 24 However, the international law
of immunities cannot in fact be dispensed with so quickly. The problem
becomes clear upon examination.
22. ICC Treaty, supra note 9, art. 19(6); see also id., art. 95.
23. See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT 101-103 (2001).
24. See ICC Treaty, supra note 9, art. 27.
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The best starting point for examination of this issue is the 2002 deci-
sion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the case of the Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo (D.R.C.) versus Belgium. 25  The case
concerned an international warrant, issued by Belgium, for the arrest of
the then foreign minister of the D.R.C. for crimes including crimes against
humanity. The D.R.C. claimed that the international law of immunities
was violated by the issuance of that warrant.
The ICJ held that:
The Court ... concludes that the functions of a Minister for Foreign Affairs
are such that, throughout the duration of his or her office, he or she when
abroad enjoys full immunity from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability.
That immunity and inviolability protect the individual concerned against
any act of authority of another State which would hinder him or her in the
performance of his or her duties. 26
However, the ICJ majority went on to say that, even though a foreign
minister would be immune from criminal proceedings before the courts of
another state,
an incumbent or former Minister for Foreign Affairs may be subject to crimi-
nal proceedings before certain international criminal courts, where they
have jurisdiction. Examples include . . .the future International Criminal
Court created by the 1998 Rome Convention. The latter's Statute expressly
provides, in Article 27, paragraph 2, that "[ijmmunities or special procedu-
ral rules which may attach to the official capacity of a person, whether
under national or international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising
its jurisdiction over such a person." 27
The ICJ appears to have spoken too broadly in this respect. In fact, if
the question is analyzed consistently with the ICJ majority's own holding
on immunities, the conclusion must be that the ICC would have the power
to prosecute an incumbent foreign minister (or other covered official) of a
state that is a party to the ICC Treaty, but would not be empowered to
prosecute a covered official of a state that is not a party to the treaty. This
point becomes clear when we consider the basis for the ICC's purported
jurisdiction over nationals of states that are not parties to the ICC Treaty.
The ICC Treaty provides that, under certain circumstances, the ICC
may exercise jurisdiction even over nationals of states that are not parties
to the treaty and have not otherwise consented to the Court's jurisdiction.
Article 12 provides that, in addition to jurisdiction based on Security
Council referral and jurisdiction based on consent by the defendant's state
of nationality, the ICC will have jurisdiction to prosecute the national of
any state when crimes within the Court's subject-matter jurisdiction are
committed on the territory of a state that is a party to the treaty or that
consents ad hoc to ICC jurisdiction for that case. 2 8 That territorial basis
25. Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of
Congo v. Belgium), I.C.J. General List No. 121, 14 February, 2002.
26. Id. at 54.
27. Id. at 61.
28. ICC Treaty, supra note 9, art. 12.
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would empower the Court to exercise jurisdiction even in cases where the
defendant's state of nationality is not a party to the treaty and does not
consent to the exercise of jurisdiction.2 9
Advocates of ICC jurisdiction over non-party nationals argue that the
foundation for the ICC's jurisdiction over non-party nationals when the
crime is committed on the territory of a state party is that the territorial
state has delegated its territorial jurisdiction to be exercised by the ICC. 30
The reasoning is that, since the territorial state would have the right to
prosecute for offenses committed on its territory, the territorial state also
has the right to delegate that jurisdiction to be exercised by an interna-
tional court.3 1
Offering a variant on this rationale, some proponents have contended
that ICC jurisdiction over the nationals of non-party states is based upon
the principles of universal jurisdiction pursuant to which the courts of any
state may prosecute the nationals of any state for certain international
crimes. Since any individual state could prosecute perpetrators regardless
of their nationality, it is argued, a group of states may create an interna-
tional court empowered to do the same. Under this theory, each state
party, in effect, delegates to the international court its universal jurisdic-
tion.32 Under either theory (delegated territorial jurisdiction or delegated
universal jurisdiction), the ICC's jurisdiction over nationals of non-party
states rests on the delegated jurisdiction of one or more states.
The overbreadth in the ICJ's reasoning concerning immunity before
the ICC now becomes clear. Obviously, states (the territorial state or,
under the delegated-universal-jurisdiction theory, any or all states parties)
can delegate to the ICC only such jurisdiction as those states have. If
states are obliged to recognize a certain immunity, as the ICJ's decision in
Congo v. Belgium requires, then those states' delegated jurisdiction logi-
cally must carry that immunity with it. The consequence is that, if states
would be legally required to afford immunity from prosecution to sitting
heads of state, foreign ministers, and perhaps other high officials, then the
ICC (when acting without Security Council referral and without the con-
sent of the officials' state of nationality) would be similarly constrained.
This immunity before the ICC would apply only to non-party nation-
als; it would not apply to officials of states parties to the ICC Treaty. States
parties waive the immunity of their officials under Article 27 of that treaty,
which states that "immunities ... which may attach to the official capacity
of a person ... shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over
29. The issue of ICC jurisdiction over non-party nationals is addressed briefly
above, supra, lI.A.
30. See, e.g., Michael Scharf, The ICC's Jurisdiction Over the Nationals of Non-Party
States: A Critique of the U.S. Position, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 67 (Winter 2001).
31. For full and contrasting treatments of the issue of ICC jurisdiction over non-
party nationals, see Morris, High Crimes and Misconceptions, supra note 6 and Scharf,
supra note 30.
32. See, e.g., Scharf, The ICC's Jurisdiction Over the Nationals of Non-Party States: A
Critique of the U.S. Position, supra note 30 at 77. For a critique of this view, see Morris,
High Crimes, supra note 6.
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such a person." But that treaty provision constitutes a waiver of immunity
only by states parties. The head of state or foreign minister of a non-party
state would maintain immunity.3 3 So where an individual responsible for
a terrorist crime is a head of state, foreign minister or, perhaps, other high
official of a non-party state, the ICC cannot lawfully exercise jurisdiction
over that individual, at least not consistent with international immunity
principles as articulated in the ICJ's decision in Congo v. Belgium.
D. Additional Limitations Affecting the ICC's Capacity to Adjudicate
Crimes Added by Amendment to the ICC Treaty
The ICC Treaty limits the ICC's subject-matter jurisdiction to geno-
cide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.3 4 However, in the negotia-
tions leading up to the adoption of the ICC Treaty, extensive debate
focused on the possibility of encompassing within the jurisdiction of the
ICC certain "treaty crimes"-including the terrorism crimes defined in the
treaties on hijacking and aircraft sabotage, 3 5 crimes against internationally
protected persons, 36 hostage taking,3 7 sabotage of marine navigation, 38
and the like. In the course of the negotiations, the decision ultimately
taken was to exclude those treaty crimes from the jurisdiction of the
Court.39 But Resolution E, adopted at the last moments of the Rome Con-
ference at which the ICC Treaty was adopted, provides for reconsideration
of the inclusion of the "treaty crimes." Resolution E states that the Rome
Conference, "[A]ffirm[s] that the Statute of the ICC provides for a review
33. This conclusion is consistent with the thrust of Article 98(1) of the ICC Treaty,
which provides that:
[tihe Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance which
would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under
international law with respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a person
or property of a third State, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of
that third State for the waiver of the immunity.
ICC Treaty, supra note 9, art. 98(1).
34. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
35. See Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, supra note 6;
Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil
Aviation, supra note 3; Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at
Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, supra note 6.
36. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internation-
ally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, supra note 6.
37. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, supra note 6.
38. Convention and Protocol on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety
of Maritime Navigation, supra note 6.
39. There were a number of reasons for excluding terrorist offenses (as well as drug
trafficking and other "treaty crimes") from the jurisdiction of the ICC under the Rome
Treaty. In part, the attempt to include terrorist offenses failed because of states' disa-
greement over the proper definition of "terrorism." See supra note 12. In addition, those
who advocated exclusion of terrorism argued that the ICC would be unable to investi-
gate terrorism cases as efficiently and effectively as national governments would be able
to do and, also, that the inclusion of terrorism and drug trafficking within ICC jurisdic-
tion would overburden the limited investigative and prosecutorial resources of the ICC.
See, e.g., Comments of the United States of America Pursuant to Paragraph 4 of General
Assembly Resolution 49/53 on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court,
Report of the Secretary General, at 10-13, U.N. Doc. A/AC.244/1/Add.2 (1995).
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mechanism, which allows for an expansion in future of the jurisdiction of
the Court, [and] [r]ecommends that a Review Conference ... consider the
crimes of terrorism and drug crimes with a view to arriving at an accept-
able definition and their inclusion in the list of crimes within the jurisdic-
tion of the Court."4 0 Therefore, crimes of terrorism-even when they do
not constitute genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity-may be
brought within ICC jurisdiction in the future.
If the ICC Treaty is amended in the future to include terrorist crimes
that do not constitute genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity,
the limitations on the ICC's capacity to prosecute those additional offenses
will be greater than those that affect the ICC's jurisdiction over the crimes
currently within its jurisdiction. In addition to the existing limitations
based on jurisdictional structure, complementarity, and immunities that
affect prosecutions for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity,
there is a further significant limitation that will apply to offenses added to
the jurisdiction of the ICC through amendment of the ICC Treaty. Article
121(5) of the Treaty states that: "In respect of a State Party which has not
accepted the amendment, the Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction
regarding a crime covered by the amendment when committed by that
State Party's nationals or on its territory."'4 1 The ICC treaty amendment
process is based on the vote of a super-majority of ICC states parties.4 2
The limiting provision in Article 121(5) was included because states par-
ties were not prepared to relegate future decisions concerning ICC jurisdic-
tion over crimes committed on their territories or by their nationals to a
super-majority of ICC states parties. Consequently, with regard to states
parties, the ICC would have jurisdiction over terrorist crimes added by
amendment only if the crime were committed by the national of a state and
on the territory of a state that had accepted the addition of that particular
crime to the jurisdiction of the ICC.
The implications of Article 121(5) are less clear for states that are not
parties to the ICC Treaty. While the Treaty allows states parties to opt out
of ICC jurisdiction over added offenses, the Treaty appears, ironically, to
assert ICC jurisdiction over non-party nationals for those same added
offenses. The US has proposed language, to be included in the Rules of
Procedure for the ICC Assembly of States Parties, which would provide
that,
[w]ith respect to a crime added by amendment to the Statute pursuant to
article 121, paragraph 5, the court may exercise jurisdiction only if the
amendment has entered into force for both the State of nationality of the
alleged perpetrator and the State in whose territory the crime was
40. FINAL ACT OF THE UNITED NATIONS DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF PLENIPOTENTIARIES
ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, Annex I, Resolution E,
adopted 17 July 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF. 183/10.
41. ICC Treaty, supra note 9, art. 121(5).
42. ICC Treaty, supra note 9, art. 121.
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committed.4 3
That proposal has not been adopted to date, and this issue remains the
subject of controversy. 44 What is clear, at a minimum, is that, if terrorism
offenses are added to the jurisdiction of the ICC, states parties may decline
to accept this jurisdiction. This opt-out provision represents a significant
additional limitation that would affect the ICC's capacity to prosecute ter-
rorist crimes added to the ICC's jurisdiction through amendment of the
ICC Treaty.
E. The Potential for ICC Terrorism Prosecutions in Conjunction with
Action by the UN Security Council
In sum, when the ICC acts in the absence of a Security Council refer-
ral, its ability to exercise jurisdiction over terrorist crimes is limited in a
variety of ways reflecting underlying international political concerns.
Those constraints may be substantially circumvented in the event that the
UN Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, refers
the case in question to the ICC.
Under the terms of the ICC Treaty, when the Security Council refers a
case, it is not a precondition to the exercise of the ICC's jurisdiction that
the territorial state or the defendant's state of nationality be a party to the
treaty. 4 5 Complementarity likely also can be circumvented through the
use of a Chapter VII resolution (though this is less clear). 4 6 (The reasoning
here is that, acting under Chapter VII, the Security Council could effec-
tively require a state to forego domestic handling of a case in order for the
ICC to handle the matter.) Immunities, evidently, can be abrogated by
Chapter VII resolutions, as was done in the Chapter VII resolutions that
established the the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugo-
slavia and Rwanda. 47
If the Security Council were to refer a case to the ICC, and thereby to
use its Chapter VII powers to augment the powers of the ICC 4 8 (or, for that
matter, if the Security Council were to create a separate ad hoc interna-
tional criminal tribunal to address some particular situation or were to use
43. Working Group on Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Proposal Submitted by the
United States of America Concerning Rules of Evidence and Procedure Relating to Part
13 of the Statute (Final Clauses) 2, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/WGRPE(13)/DP. 1 (2000).
44. See Scheffer, supra note 19, at 81.
45. See ICC Treaty, supra note 9, arts. 12(2), 13.
46. See Ruth B. Philips, The International Court Statute:Jurisdiction and Admissibility,
10 CRIM. L. FORUM 61, 73, 81 (1999).
47. See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, art. 7(2), in Report of the Secretary-Gen-
eral Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, Annex, U.N. Doc. S/
25704 (1993); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 6(2), S.C.
Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 3453d mtg., Annex, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994).
48. The present Essay will not consider the actual likelihood of Security Council
referrals to the ICC, which may be remote given the relevant political factors including
US objections to provisions of the ICC Treaty. See generally, Morris, High Crimes, supra
note 6 (regarding US objections to the ICC Treaty).
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its Chapter VII powers to augment or supplement the authority of national
courts), we would return, full circle, to the posture of the Lockerbie case,
where resort was made to the UN Security Council as the authority "above"
the state. In this way, as in so many others, the Security Council wields
superordinate powers within the international legal system.
Conclusion
The likely involvement of states as targets or sponsors of terrorism has
created an impetus to internationalize law enforcement in this field
through the use of international criminal courts, universal jurisdiction, or
UN Security Council powers. But the international political features of
international terrorism significantly limit the potential scope and efficacy
of such internationalizing mechanisms. Consequently, the prosecution of
terrorism cases to date is pursued at the national level, largely in the
targeted state. To attribute this state of affairs simply to "US unilateralism"
is to ignore much of the relevant political and legal context. When the
political and legal realities are properly taken into account, it becomes evi-
dent that the practice of relying on domestic courts for the prosecution of
terrorist offenses-in the US and elsewhere-as imperfect as it is, likely
will, and quite probably should, remain in place for the foreseeable future.

